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Abstract
Security of cryptographic primitives is usually proved by assuming “ideal” probability distributions.
We need to replace them with approximated “real” distributions in the real-world systems without
losing the security level. We demonstrate that the Hellinger distance is useful for this problem,
while the statistical distance is mainly used in the cryptographic literature. First, we show that for
preserving λ-bit security of a given security game, the closeness of 2−λ/2 to the ideal distribution is
sufficient for the Hellinger distance, whereas 2−λ is generally required for the statistical distance.
The result can be applied to both search and decision primitives through the bit security framework
of Micciancio and Walter (Eurocrypt 2018). We also show that the Hellinger distance gives a tighter
evaluation of closeness than the max-log distance when the distance is small. Finally, we show
that the leftover hash lemma can be strengthened to the Hellinger distance. Namely, a universal
family of hash functions gives a strong randomness extractor with optimal entropy loss for the
Hellinger distance. Based on the results, a λ-bit entropy loss in randomness extractors is sufficient
for preserving λ-bit security. The current understanding based on the statistical distance is that a
2λ-bit entropy loss is necessary.
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1 Introduction
Security of cryptographic primitives relies on the use of randomness sources. Secret keys
and random bits are usually assumed to be sampled from uniform distributions. Various
probability distributions other than uniform ones appear in cryptography. In lattice-based
cryptography, discrete Gaussian distributions are used for the hardness of the Learning with
Errors (LWE) problem [32, 31, 21, 27] and the tight reductions for the Short Integer Solution
(SIS) problem [24, 23]. Adding noise from Laplace distributions enables data privacy of
statistical databases in differential privacy [15, 14, 16].
To ensure the security of primitives, we usually define a security game played by an
adversary and show that the adversary’s success probability is sufficiently close to some
value. In the proof, we assume we can use “ideal” probability distributions. We need to
replace them with approximated “real” distributions in real-world systems. For example, in a
security game of an encryption scheme, the adversary receives a ciphertext and tries to guess
which of the two plaintexts were encrypted. The scheme is secure if the success probability
is sufficiently close to 1/2. A secret key and random coins for encryption are assumed
to be sampled from uniform distributions. One may employ the output of a randomness
extractor [33, 11] as a randomness source since the output distribution is sufficiently close
to the uniform distribution. However, the distance to the ideal distribution may affect the
security level of primitives. A question is which closeness measure of distributions should be
used when replacing distributions in security games.
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In cryptographic literature, we mainly employ the statistical distance (a.k.a. the total
variation distance) to measure distribution closeness. The main reason is that it enables a
straightforward analysis of the resulting security levels. The statistical distance is defined as
the maximum difference of probabilities of events between two distributions. By employing a
distribution P that is close to ideal Q within ϵ in the statistical distance, we can guarantee
that the adversary’s success probability only increases by at most ϵ. However, there may not
be any other reason for using the statistical distance.
Also, achieving security by the statistical distance has some limitations. Radhakrishnan
and Ta-Shma [30] showed a lower bound on the entropy loss of randomness extractors.
Roughly, the result implies that to extract a uniformly random string from an entropy source,
we need to lose 2 log(1/ϵ) of entropy, where ϵ is the distance to the uniform distribution.
Based on this result, if we extract a random string from a source of 120-bit entropy by
ensuring 50-bit security, the output bit should be of length at most 120 − 2 · 50 = 20. This
loss of entropy is crucial when using biometric data as entropy sources [11, 8], where a limited
amount of entropy can be used. Randomness extraction (or key derivation) from weak sources
arises in many situations of cryptography, including Diffie-Hellman key exchange [17, 20]
and random number generators from physical sources [5, 4], to name a few.
Our Contribution
In this work, we propose to use the Hellinger distance for replacing distributions in security
games. Roughly speaking, we show that the closeness of 2−λ/2 in the Hellinger distance is
sufficient to preserve λ-bit security. When using the statistical distance, the closeness of 2−λ
is, in general, necessary to achieve the same security level.
To discuss the bit security, we use the framework of Micciancio and Walter [26]. Their
framework can smoothly connect the bit security between search and decision primitives.
Their definition is the same as the standard one for search primitives, where the secret is
chosen from a sufficiently large space. For decision primitives, in which the attacker tries to
guess a secret bit, the definition of the advantage is different from the standard one. See
Section 3 for the details. We show that the distance closeness of 2−λ/2 in the Hellinger
distance is sufficient for preserving the bit security for both search and decision primitives.
Next, we show that the Hellinger distance gives a tighter evaluation of closeness than
the max-log distance, the probability metric introduced in [25, 26]. The work showed that
the closeness of 2−λ/2 in the max-log distance is sufficient for preserving λ-bit security. We
proved that the Hellinger distance is bounded above by the max-log distance as long as the
max-log distance is at most
√
2 − 1. Also, we present a concrete example of a distribution
pair such that their Hellinger distance is exponentially small, while their max-log distance is
a constant.
Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of using the Hellinger distance in the problem of
randomness extraction (or information-theoretic key derivation). We show that the leftover
hash lemma [6, 19] can be strengthened to the Hellinger distance without losing the security
level. Namely, a universal family of hash functions gives a strong randomness extractor with
optimal entropy loss even when measuring in the Hellinger distance. We can conclude that
the entropy loss of λ-bit is sufficient for preserving λ-bit security. In general, the entropy
loss of 2λ-bit is necessary to preserve bit security when using the statistical distance.
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Techniques
We describe a technical overview of our results. Although the actual proofs seem different
from the below, it reflects the difference between the statistical distance and the Hellinger
distance. Let P = (P1, P2, . . . ) and Q = (Q1, Q2, . . . ) be a pair of probability distribution
ensembles such that each Pi is close to Qi. Let ϵQA be the probability that an adversary
A succeeds in the security game in which samples from Q is used. We want to bound the
probability ϵPA, which is the success probability when using P instead of Q.
For ℓ ∈ N, we define the probability µQℓ that A succeeds in at least one out of ℓ independent
plays of GQA. As long as ℓ is small compared to 1/ϵPA, it holds that µPℓ ≈ ℓ · ϵPA. Since the
number of sample queries in each game is bounded above by the running time TA of A,
µPℓ ≤ µ
Q
ℓ + SD(P ℓ, Qℓ) ≤ µ
Q
ℓ + ℓTA · maxi SD(Pi, Qi), where SD(Pi, Qi) is the statistical
distance between Pi and Qi, and P ℓ is the ℓ-fold product of P . Note that we use the relation
SD(P ℓ, Qℓ) ≤ ℓTA · maxi SD(Pi, Qi). Now, it holds that ϵPA ≈ ℓ−1 · µPℓ ≤ ℓ−1 · (µ
Q
ℓ + ℓTA ·
maxi SD(Pi, Qi)) ≈ ϵQA + TA · maxi SD(Pi, Qi). Thus, if the primitive has λ-bit security, i.e.,
ϵQA/TA ≤ 2−λ, then ϵPA/TA ≤ 2−λ + maxi SD(Pi, Qi). It implies that maxi SD(Pi, Qi) ≤ 2−λ
is required for preserving bit security. For the Hellinger distance HD(Pi, Qi), we provide a
technical lemma (Lemma 1) showing that SD(P ℓ, Qℓ) ≤
√
2ℓTA · maxi HD(Pi, Qi). Therefore,




2ℓ−1TA · maxi HD(Pi, Qi). Hence, if the primitive has λ-bit security,
ϵPA/TA ≤ 2−λ +
√
2(ℓTA)−1 ·maxi HD(Pi, Qi), implying that, by choosing ℓ = 1/ϵPA, it suffices
to satisfy maxi HD(Pi, Qi) ≤ 2−λ/2 for preserving bit security.
The leftover hash lemma essentially gives an upper bound on the collision probability of
the hash functions chosen from a universal family. If the collision probability is bounded,
it is close to uniform in the Hellinger distance. This relation was provided by Chung and
Vadhan [9] using Hölder’s inequality. Based on the relation, we show that a universal family
of hash functions gives a strong randomness extractor for the Hellinger distance. Notably, we
can achieve the same parameters as in the case of the statistical distance. Thus, the optimal
entropy loss is achieved by universal hash functions.
Related Work
Barak et al. [3] initiated the study on improving the leftover hash lemma for a limited class
of primitives. The work of [3, 13] showed that the bound of [30] could be improved for the
search primitives and the square-friendly decision primitives, including stateless encryption
schemes and weak pseudorandom functions. Specifically, the entropy loss of λ is sufficient for
square-friendly primitives. For search primitives, Dodis, Pietrzak, and Wichs [12] achieved
the entropy loss of O(log λ) in randomness extraction with O(λ)-wise independent hash
functions. Matsuda et al. [22] generalized the results of [13] by using the Rényi divergence
for capturing the case that the ideal distribution is not uniform. Skorski [34] showed that
being square-friendly is necessary to reduce entropy loss. Compared with the above work,
our results for reducing entropy loss do not build on a specific class of primitives but need to
rely on the bit security framework of [26], especially for the decision primitives.
In lattice-based cryptography, several probability metrics other than the statistical
distance have been employed for improving the analysis of security proofs [28, 2, 25, 29, 36].
The metrics used in these work include the Kullback-Leibler divergence, the Rényi divergence,
the max-log distance, and the relative error.
Micciancio and Walter [26] introduced a new framework of bit security that can smoothly
connect the search primitives and the decision primitives quantitatively. A feature is that it
allows the adversary to declare an attack failure. With their framework, we can say that a
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λ-bit secure pseudorandom generator (a decision primitive) is also a λ-bit secure one-way
function (a search primitive). In the conventional definition, a λ/2-bit secure pseudorandom
generator strangely yields a λ-bit secure one-way function. While they showed that the
max-log distance is beneficial in their framework, we show that the Hellinger distance has
the same effect and gives a tighter evaluation of closeness.
Distances/divergences between distributions other than the statistical distance have
appeared in other cryptographic literature. Chung and Vadhan [9] gave a tight analysis of
hashing block sources using the Hellinger distance as a key tool. Agrawal [1] introduced the
notion of randomness extractors for the Kullback-Leibler divergence and gave explicit/non-
explicit constructions with almost the same parameters as standard extractors. Steinber-
ger [35] used the Hellinger distance for the improved analysis of key-alternating ciphers. Dai,
Hoang, and Tessaro [10] used the chi-square divergence to analyze the information-theoretic
indistinguishability proofs. Berman et al. [7] studied the polarization lemma for various
distance notions such as the triangular discrimination and the Jensen-Shannon divergence to
extend the region of polarization.
2 Preliminaries
We define the distances for distributions used in this work. The basic properties and general
relationships of various distances/divergences can be found in [18]. We also present a useful
lemma for the Hellinger distance, which will be used later.
Let P and Q be probability distributions over a finite set Ω. For a distribution P over Ω
and A ⊆ Ω, we denote by P (A) the probability of event A, which is equal to
∑
x∈A P (x).
The statistical distance (a.k.a. total variation distance) between P and Q is
SD(P, Q) = max
A⊆Ω
|P (A) − Q(A)|.
The data processing inequality guarantees that for any function f : Ω → {0, 1}∗, we have
SD(f(P ), f(Q)) ≤ SD(P, Q). (1)


















P (x) · Q(x),
which takes values in [0, 1]. It holds that
HD(P, Q)2 ≤ SD(P, Q) ≤
√
2 · HD(P, Q). (2)
The Hellinger affinity is defined as




P (x) · Q(x),
which is also known as the Bhattacharyya coefficient or fidelity.
The Hellinger distance has the following useful property, which is weaker than the
Pythagorean probability preservation defined in [25, 26].
▶ Lemma 1. Let Q = (Q1, . . . , Qℓ) and P = (P1, . . . , Pℓ) be probability distribution ensembles












Proof. Let ϵ = maxai∈
∏
j<i
Ωj HD(Pi|ai, Qi|ai). Then, HA(Pi|ai, Qi|ai) = 1 −
HD(Pi|ai, Qi|ai)2 ≥ 1 − ϵ2 for any i and ai ∈
∏





























≥ (1 − ϵ2)ℓ ≥ 1 − ℓϵ2,
where P1,ℓ−1 = (P1, . . . , Pℓ−1) and Q1,ℓ−1 = (Q1, . . . , Qℓ−1). Thus, HD(P, Q) =√
1 − HA(P, Q) ≤
√
ℓϵ. The statement follows from (2). ◀
3 Replacing Distributions in Security Games
We consider replacing probability distributions in security games. Let Q = (Qθ)θ be an
ideal distribution ensemble in a security game. We want to replace Q with an approximated
distribution ensemble P = (Pθ)θ without compromising security. We define a general security
game by following the definitions of [26, 25].
An n-bit security game GA is a game played by an adversary A interacting with a
challenger C. At the beginning of the game, the challenger chooses a uniformly random
secret x ∈ {0, 1}n, represented by the random variable X. At the end of the game, A outputs
some value v, represented by the random variable V . The goal of the adversary is to output
v such that R(x, v) = 1, where R is a Boolean function. The adversary may output a special
symbol ⊥ such that R(x, ⊥) = 0 for any x. During the game, A or C may obtain a sample
from a distribution Qθ by querying θ. The success probability of A is ϵQA = Pr[R(X, V ) = 1],
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the entire security game, including
the randomness of A. We may denote the game by GQA since we intend to replace Q with
another distribution ensemble.
Micciancio and Walter [26] defined the bit security based on an advantage that is different
from most of the literature for the case n = 1. We use their framework for evaluating the
security loss by replacing distributions in security games.
▶ Definition 2 (Bit Security of [26]). Let Π be a primitive for which an n-bit security game GQA
is defined. Let X and V be random variables representing a random secret x ∈ {0, 1}n and an
output value v of A in GQA, respectively. We define the output probability αA = Pr[V ̸= ⊥]
and the conditional success probability βA = Pr[R(X, V ) = 1 | V ̸= ⊥]. The advantage of A
is defined to be
advA =
{
αAβA n > 1
αA(2βA − 1)2 n = 1
.







where TA is the running time of A. We say the primitive is λ-bit secure if its bit security is
at least λ.
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We say Π is a search primitive if its n-bit security game G is defined for n > 1, and a
decision primitive if G is a 1-bit security game.
For search primitives, it is not difficult to see that Q = (Qθ)θ can be replaced with
P = (Pθ)θ if their statistical distance between Pθ and Qθ is sufficiently small and the
number of queries is not so much. Specifically, if a search primitive ΠQ is λ-bit secure and
SD(Pθ, Qθ) ≤ 2−λ, then ΠP is (λ − log q)-bit secure, where we denote by ΠQ a primitive
for which a security game GQA is defined and q is the number of queries. This fact implies
that it is sufficient to choose P that is close to Q within 2−λ in the statistical distance for
preserving the bit security.
Micciancio and Walter [25, 26] demonstrated that if distributions are close in the max-
log distance, the closeness requirement may be relaxed. The max-log distance between
distributions P and Q over Ω with the same support S ⊆ Ω is
ML(P, Q) = max
x∈S
| ln P (x) − ln Q(x)|.
They showed that the closeness of 2−λ/2 is sufficient to preserve the bit security for search
primitives in [25] and decision primitives in [26].
▶ Lemma 3 ([25, 26]). Let Q = (Qi)i and P = (Pi)i be distribution ensembles over the
support
∏
i Ωi satisfying ML(Pi|ai, Qi|ai) ≤ 2−λ/2 ≤ 1/4 for any i and ai ∈
∏
j<i Ωj. If a
search primitive ΠQ is λ-bit secure, then ΠP is (λ − 3)-bit secure. If a decision primitive ΠQ
is λ-bit secure, then ΠP is (λ − 8)-bit secure.
They showed the above results for a more general class of λ-efficient divergences [25, 26].
We demonstrate that similar effects can be obtained by using the Hellinger distance.
3.1 Security for Search Primitives
Let Q = (Qi)i and P = (Pi)i be distribution ensembles over the same support
∏
i Ωi. We
consider P and Q satisfying HD(Pi|ai, Qi|ai) ≤ 2−λ/2 for any i and ai ∈
∏
j<i Ωj . We call
such a pair (P, Q) a 2−λ/2-Hellinger close pair. We show that this closeness is sufficient for
preserving bit security.
▶ Theorem 4. Let ΠQ be a primitive for which an n-bit security game GQA is defined for n > 1.
For any 2−λ/2-Hellinger close pair (P, Q), if ΠQ is λ-bit secure, then ΠP is (λ − 2.973)-bit
secure.
Proof. Let ϵQA be the success probability of an adversary A in G
Q
A, and TA the running time
of A. Since Π is λ-bit secure, it holds that ϵQA/TA ≤ 2−λ for any A. It is sufficient to show
that ϵPA/TA < 2−(λ−2.973), where ϵPA is the success probability of A in GPA.
We consider ℓ independent plays of GQA and define µ
Q
ℓ to be the probability that A
succeeds in at least one out of ℓ plays of GQA. Namely, µ
Q
ℓ = 1 − (1 − ϵQ)ℓ. We define µPA
analogously. Since the number of queries to the distribution ensemble is at most TA in each
play, it holds that∣∣∣µPℓ − µQℓ ∣∣∣ ≤ SD (P ℓ, Qℓ) ≤ √2ℓTA · 2−λ/2,
where P ℓ is the ℓ-fold product of P , the first inequality is by the data processing inequality,




2ℓTA · 2−λ/2 + (1 − ϵPA)ℓ.
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2(1 − e−1)2 .
Since ϵQA/TA ≤ 2−λ, we have ϵPA/TA < 7.851 · 2−λ < 22.973 · 2−λ. Therefore, the statement
follows. ◀
3.2 Security for Decision Primitives
Next, we show that the closeness of 2−λ/2 in the Hellinger distance is sufficient for preserving
λ-bit security even for decision primitives.
▶ Theorem 5. Let ΠQ be a primitive for which a 1-bit security game GQA is defined. For any
2−λ/2-Hellinger close pair (P, Q), if ΠQ is λ-bit secure, then ΠP is (λ − 6.847)-bit secure.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that ΠP is not (λ − 6.667)-bit secure. Namely, there exists
an adversary A for ΠP with running time TA such that αPA(2βPA − 1)2 > TA/2λ−6.847, where
αQA and β
Q
A are the output probability and the conditional success probability of A. Since
ΠQ is λ-bit secure, we have αQA(2β
Q




A are the corresponding
probabilities for ΠQ. Let α = min{αQA, αPA}.
We define the games G̃QA and G̃PA such that they are the same as G
Q
A and GPA with
the difference that the adversary can restart the game with fresh randomness at any time.
Consider the adversary B that runs A repeatedly until either the output value is different
from ⊥ or B runs A in total 1/α times, and outputs the same value as A does in the former
and ⊥ in the latter. Let αQB and β
Q
B be the output probability and the conditional success
probability, respectively when playing G̃QB . We also define αPB and βPB analogously. Then, it
holds that βQB = β
Q
A and βPB = βPA . The running time of B satisfies TB ≤ TA/α. It follows







2βPB − 1 ≤ 2β
Q
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Since βQB = β
Q
A , it holds that
2βQB − 1 = 2β
Q




It follows from the above inequalities that


















If α = αPA, the above inequality implies that ΠP is (λ − 3.874)-bit secure. Otherwise, we have







where the last inequality follows from the assumption. In the proof of Theorem 4, if we
consider the event that A outputs values other than ⊥ instead of the event that A succeeds,
it implies that αPA < 22.973 · α
Q
A for 2−λ/2-Hellinger close pair (P, Q). This contradicts the
above inequality. Therefore, the statement follows. ◀
Limitation of the Statistical Distance
We show that a similar result to Theorem 5 does not hold for the statistical distance. Namely,
the closeness of 2−λ/2 in the statistical distance is not sufficient for preserving security.
As a concrete example, we consider a modified one-time pad encryption scheme ΠQ. The
probabilistic encryption function for messages over {0, 1}λ is defined to be
Enck(m) =
{
(1, m) with probability 2−λ
(0, m ⊕ k) with probability 1 − 2−λ
,
where k ∈ {0, 1}λ is a key sampled according to a distribution Q. Here we assume that
Q is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}λ. Consider a distinguishing game in which, for a
random secret b ∈ {0, 1}, an attacker tries to predict b given m0, m1, and Enck(mb). The
attacker can easily find the corresponding message if the first bit of the ciphertext is 1.
Otherwise, the scheme is perfectly secure, and thus the attacker has no advantage in the
distinguishing game. Let A be an attacker such that given m0, m1, Enck(mb) = (c1, c2),






≥ TA2−λ ≥ 2
λ.
Since other adversaries cannot achieve a higher advantage than 2−λ, ΠQ has λ-bit security.
Let P be a distribution over {0, 1}λ such that
P (x) =

2−λ + 2−λ/2 x = 0λ




where |S| = 2λ/2. One may consider S a set of strings starting with 1λ/2. It holds
that SD(P, Q) = 2−λ/2. Consider an adversary A′ such that when c1 = 1, A′ outputs
b satisfying c2 = mb. When c1 = 0, A′ outputs b such that c2 = mb if c2 ∈ {m0, m1},
and ⊥ if c2 /∈ {m0, m1}. For this adversary A′, it is not difficult to see that αPA′ =
2−λ + (1 − 2−λ)(2−λ + 2−λ/2) ≥ 2−λ/2 and βPA′ = 1. Thus, the bit security of ΠP is at most
λ/2. This indicates that the closeness of 2−λ/2 in the statistical distance may reduce the bit
security by half.
4 Relations between Max-Log Distance and Hellinger Distance
We show that the Hellinger distance is bounded above by the max-log distance when the
max-log distance is less than
√
2−1. Namely, the Hellinger distance gives a tighter evaluation
of closeness when the distance is small.
▶ Proposition 6. Let P and Q be distributions over Ω with the same support S ⊆ Ω. Then,
HD(P, Q) ≤ ML(P, Q) as long as ML(P, Q) ≤
√
2 − 1.
Proof. It follows from the relation between the Hellinger distance and the chi-square diver-







(P (x) − Q(x))2
Q(x) ,
























∣∣∣∣P (x)Q(x) − 1
∣∣∣∣ .
Let ML(P, Q) = ϵ. By definition, for any x ∈ S,
e−ϵ ≤ P (x)
Q(x) ≤ e
ϵ.
Since we have the relations ey − 1 ≤ y + y2 and 1 − e−y ≤ y + y2 for y ∈ [0,
√
2], it holds that
HD(P, Q) ≤ 1√
2
(ϵ + ϵ2) ≤ ϵ,
where the last inequality holds for 0 ≤ ϵ ≤
√
2 − 1. ◀
Next, we give a concrete example of distributions for which an exponential gap exists.
We show that, for a uniform distribution Q over {0, 1}n, there is a distribution P such that
ML(P, Q) = 0.6 and HD(P, Q) ≤ 0.6 · 2−n/2.
▶ Proposition 7. Let Q be the uniform distribution over Ω with |Ω| ≥ 4. There is a
distribution P over Ω such that




for any ϵ ∈ [0, 0.618].
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Proof. Let M = |Ω|. We define P such that
P (x) =

M−1 · eϵ x = x0
M−1 · e−ϵ x = x1
(M − 2)−1 ·
(
1 − M−1(eϵ + e−ϵ)
)
x /∈ {x0, x1}
.
First we show that ML(P, Q) = ϵ. It is clear from the definition that | ln P (x) − ln Q(x)| = ϵ
for x ∈ {x0, x1}. For x /∈ {x0, x1}, we need to show that
M−1 · e−ϵ ≤ (M − 2)−1 ·
(
1 − M−1(eϵ + e−ϵ)
)
≤ M−1 · eϵ,









Since the right-hand side is at most 4 for ϵ ≥ 0, we have ML(P, Q) = ϵ.
Next, we give an upper bound on HD(P, Q). Recall that HD(P, Q) =
√
1 − HA(P, Q)




P (x) · Q(x). For x /∈ {x0, x1},






















where the inequality follows from the fact that ex + e−x ≤ 2 + x + x2 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. By
















1 − ϵ + ϵ
2
M − 2 .
Thus,
HD(P, Q)2 ≤ 1 − 2
M




1 − ϵ + ϵ
2
M − 2
≤ 1 − 2
M
− M − 2
M
(
1 − ϵ + ϵ
2















≤ 3(ϵ + ϵ
2)
8M ,
where the second and the last inequalities follow from
√
1 − x ≥ 1 − x/2 − x2/2 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
and (ϵ + ϵ2)/(2(y − 2)) ≤ 1/4 for ϵ ∈ [0, 0.618] and y ≥ 4, respectively. Hence, the statement
follows. ◀
5 Randomness Extraction for Hellinger Distance
We focus on the problem of randomness extraction from entropy sources. The min-entropy of
random variable X over {0, 1}n is Hmin(X) = minx∈{0,1}n log2(1/Pr[X = x]). Randomness
extractors are usually defined as a seeded function that maps any entropy source to a
distribution that is close to the uniform distribution in the statistical distance. For n ∈ N,
we denote by Un the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n.
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▶ Definition 8 (Randomness Extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is said
to be a (k, ϵ)-(strong) extractor if for every distribution X over {0, 1}n of Hmin(X) ≥ k, it
holds that SD((Ext(X, Ud), Ud), Um+d) ≤ ϵ, where X and Ud are independent.
For (strong) extractors, the input entropy is k + d, and the output length is m + d.
The difference (k + d) − (m + d) = k − m is called the entropy loss of extractors. The
entropy loss is unavoidable. Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [30] showed that it must be at
least 2 log(1/ϵ) − O(1).
It is known that a universal family of hash functions gives an extractor with optimal
entropy loss. A random hash function H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m from a family H of hash functions
is called universal if for any distinct x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n, Pr[H(x) = H(x′)] ≤ 2−m. Specifically,
let |H| = 2d and m = k − 2 log(1/ϵ). Then, extractor Ext defined by Ext(x, H) = H(x) is
a (k, ϵ/2)-strong extractor. This result is known as the leftover hash lemma [6, 19]. The
main technical lemma is a bound on the collision probability. For a random variable X, the
collision probability of X is




where X ′ is an independent copy of X.
▶ Lemma 9 (The Leftover Hash Lemma [6, 19]). Let X be a random variable over {0, 1}n
with Hmin(X) ≥ k. Let H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a random hash function from a universal
family H. Then, cp(H(X), H) ≤ 2−d · (2−m + 2−k).
We define a notion of extractors for which the output distribution is close to uniform in
the Hellinger distance.
▶ Definition 10 (Hellinger extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is said to be
a (k, ϵ)-(strong) Hellinger extractor if for every distribution X over {0, 1}n of Hmin(X) ≥ k,
it holds that HD((Ext(X, Ud), Ud), Um+d) ≤ ϵ, where X and Ud are independent.




We use the following useful lemma of Chung and Vadhan [9] for proving a leftover hash
lemma for the Hellinger distance.
▶ Lemma 11 ([9, Lemma 3.12]). Let X be a random variable over {0, 1}n. If cp(X) ≤ α/2n,
then HA(X, Un) ≥
√
1/α.
We show that a universal family of hash functions gives a Hellinger extractor with optimal
entropy loss.
▶ Theorem 12 (Leftover Hash Lemma for Hellinger). Let H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a random
hash function from a universal family H with |H| = 2d, m = k+1−2 log(1/ϵ). Then, function
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m defined by Ext(x, H) = H(x) is a (k, ϵ)-Hellinger extractor.
Proof. Let X be a random variable over {0, 1}n with Hmin(X) ≥ k. It follows from Lemma 9
that
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where α = 1 + 2m−k. By Lemma 11, we have that HA((H(X), H), Um+d) ≥ α−1/2. Then,
it holds that
HD((H(X), H), Um+d) =
√
1 − HA((H(X), H), Um+d)2
≤
√
1 − α−1/2 =
√
1 − (1 + 2m−k)−1/2
≤
√
1 − (1 − 2m−k−1) =
√
2m−k−1 = ϵ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (1 + x)−1/2 ≥ 1 − x/2 for x ≥ 0. Hence,
the statement follows. ◀
Since we have the relation that SD(P, Q) ≤
√
2 ·HD(P, Q), the lower bound of [30] implies
that the entropy loss of Theorem 12 is also optimal.
Entropy Loss of Randomness Extractors in Security Games
We consider the situations in which a uniform distribution is employed in security games, and
we would like to replace it with an output of randomness extractors. Let Π be a primitive
with an n-bit security game GQA such that the uniform distribution Q = Um is employed.
Suppose that Π has λ-bit security.
Theorems 4 and 5 imply that for preserving the bit security when replacing Q with P , it
is enough to hold HD(P, Q) ≤ 2−λ/2. Regarding the statistical distance, the closeness of 2−λ
is sufficient for preserving security.
A universal family of hash functions can achieve the security of extractors for both
distances. When using the statistical distance, the entropy loss for achieving SD(P, Q) ≤ 2−λ
is k − m = 2(λ − 1). By Theorem 12, the entropy loss for HD(P, Q) ≤ 2−λ/2 is k − m = λ − 1.
Thus, by analyzing security games via the Hellinger distance, the entropy loss for preserving
λ-bit security can be reduced by half.
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